Lesson 7 of 10 · 18 min

Market power and asymmetric information

Explain how a firm with market power restricts output and loses efficiency, how adverse selection and moral hazard misallocate resources, and what the ACCC, warranties and insurance rules do about them.

What you will be able to do

  • Explain how market power raises price above cost and restricts output, creating a deadweight loss.
  • Explain the effects of market power on productive and dynamic efficiency.
  • Explain adverse selection with the market for lemons, and moral hazard, with examples.
  • Describe ways of reducing each problem, including the role of the ACCC.

The syllabus lets schools choose which special cases of market failure to study. This lesson covers two of them, market power and asymmetric information, and the next lesson covers the commons. Each stands on its own.

Market power. In perfect competition, rivals force each firm to sell at the competitive price, where price equals the marginal cost of the last unit. A firm with market power (a monopoly, or a dominant firm in an oligopoly) faces no such pressure. It can raise its price, and when it does it sells less, but each sale earns more. A profit-maximising firm with power keeps raising its price until the extra revenue from a higher price no longer covers the sales it loses.

Interactive

Raise the dominant firm's price

The demand curve runs from $100 at 0 units to $0 at 1000 units, and marginal cost is $20. Start at the competitive price and raise it.

In the widget's market, a competitive market sells 800 units at $20. The dominant firm sells 400 units at $60, and marginal cost is a constant $20. Calculate the deadweight loss: the value lost on the 400 units that are no longer produced, shown by the triangle between demand and marginal cost.

in dollars
What market power does to the three efficiencies
EfficiencyEffect of market power
AllocativePrice is above marginal cost, so units worth more to buyers than they cost to make are not produced: a deadweight loss. Consumers pay more and some go without.
ProductiveWithout rivals' pressure, costs can creep up: management slack, waste, out-of-date methods (sometimes called X-inefficiency). But a large firm may also enjoy economies of scale that lower its costs.
DynamicA protected firm may innovate less because it does not have to. Or its profits may fund research a small firm could not afford. The evidence differs by industry.

Note

The ACCC and the courts

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission enforces the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. It investigates and takes to the Federal Court cartel conduct (competitors agreeing on prices, sharing markets or rigging bids), misuse of market power (conduct by a firm with substantial power that has the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition), and exclusive dealing. It reviews mergers that could substantially lessen competition; since 1 January 2026, acquisitions above set thresholds must be notified to the ACCC and cleared before they go ahead. It also runs market studies, such as the supermarkets inquiry it reported on in March 2025. Market concentration is covered in depth in case option A of Unit 2 Topic 2.

Asymmetric information. Markets allocate well when buyers and sellers know what they are trading. Often one side knows much more than the other: the seller of a used car knows its history, a person buying insurance knows how careful they are. This asymmetric (imperfect) information causes two problems.

Definition

Adverse selection and moral hazard

Adverse selection is hidden information before a deal. The party who knows more is more likely to trade when the deal is bad for the other side: the owners of poor cars are keenest to sell; the people most likely to claim are keenest to insure.

Moral hazard is hidden action after a deal. Someone protected from a risk takes more of it, because someone else bears the cost: an insured driver who parks carelessly, a bank that lends riskily expecting to be rescued.

Worked example

The market for lemons

  • Complex unfamiliar

In an illustrative used-car market, half the cars for sale are good and half are lemons. Buyers value a good car at $20 000 and a lemon at $8000; owners of good cars would sell for $17 000 or more, and owners of lemons for $6000 or more. Sellers know which kind they have; buyers cannot tell.

(a) What is the most a buyer will pay for a car of unknown quality? (b) Explain what happens to the good cars, and to the price. (c) Explain why this is a misallocation of resources, and calculate the gain lost on each good car that is not sold. (d) Explain how a statutory warranty helps.

4 steps

Try it yourself first, then check the working one step at a time.

Method

  1. Expected value = probability-weighted average.

  2. Compare it with what owners of good cars will accept.

  3. Value lost per trade = buyer value − seller value.

Watch out for

  • Calling this moral hazard. The hidden thing is information before the sale: adverse selection.

The economist George Akerlof described this in "The Market for 'Lemons'" (1970). Because buyers cannot tell good cars from lemons (bad ones), they pay only an average price. Owners of good cars will not sell at that price, so good cars leave the market, the average quality falls, and the price buyers will pay falls further. Trades that would benefit both sides never happen: a misallocation of resources. In the extreme the market for good used cars disappears.

Remedies for asymmetric information
ProblemRemedyExample
Adverse selection in used carsWarranties, independent inspections, vehicle history checks, licensing of dealersIn Queensland, a licensed dealer must give a statutory warranty on many used cars: a Class A car (under 160 000 km and built no more than 10 years before sale) is covered for 3 months or 5000 km, whichever comes first.
Adverse selection in health insuranceRules that bring low-risk people into the poolThe Lifetime Health Cover loading adds 2% to hospital cover premiums for each year a person is over 30 when they first take it out, so people are encouraged to join while young and healthy.
Moral hazard in insuranceAn excess the insured pays, no-claim bonuses, conditions in the policyA car insurer's excess means the driver still bears part of any loss.
Moral hazard in bankingPrudential regulation and supervisionAPRA sets capital and lending standards for banks, so they cannot load risk onto depositors and taxpayers.

Classify each situation as adverse selection or moral hazard.

Common mistake

Moral hazard is not about morals

The name is old insurance language. Moral hazard is a change in behaviour caused by being protected from the cost of a risk. It does not require anyone to be dishonest: a driver who brakes a little later because they are insured is an example.

Summary

  • A firm with market power sets price above marginal cost and restricts output: allocative inefficiency and a deadweight loss.

  • Market power can also raise costs (productive inefficiency); its effect on innovation (dynamic efficiency) can go either way.

  • The ACCC enforces the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 against cartels, misuse of market power and anticompetitive mergers.

  • Adverse selection: hidden information before a deal (lemons). Moral hazard: hidden action after it (insured risk-taking).

  • Warranties, inspections, insurance excesses, premium loadings and prudential regulation reduce information failures.

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