Lesson 8 of 10 · 16 min
The tragedy of the commons and property rights
Explain why common resources such as fisheries and the atmosphere are overused, why global problems like climate change and space junk are hard to coordinate, and how extending property rights can fix the commons.
What you will be able to do
- Explain the tragedy of the commons as a result of rival, non-excludable resources and ill-defined property rights.
- Explain why the lack of common ownership and the need for global coordination limit governments' options on global warming and space junk.
- Describe the features of well-defined property rights, and explain how exclusive economic zones, quotas and zoning in national parks can resolve the commons problem.
Picture a fishery that anyone may fish. Each skipper knows that if the fleet catches too much this season, there will be fewer fish next season. But if one skipper holds back, the fish they leave are simply caught by someone else. So every skipper fishes hard, and the stock collapses, even though every skipper would have been better off if all had fished less.
Definition
The tragedy of the commons
A common resource is rival (fish caught by one boat cannot be caught by another) but non-excludable (nobody can be kept out). The tragedy of the commons, named by the ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968, is the overuse and depletion of such a resource because each user gains the full benefit of using a little more but bears only a small share of the cost, which is spread over everyone.
Worked example
Why each boat overfishes a shared stock
Five boats share an open-access fishery. If one boat catches an extra 10 tonnes this season, it earns an extra $30 000. Because the stock is then smaller, next season's total catch for the fishery falls by an amount worth $60 000, shared equally among the five boats.
(a) Calculate the net gain to the boat that fishes more. (b) Calculate the net effect on the fishery as a whole. (c) Explain why this leads to the tragedy of the commons.
Step 1: The boat's own cost
The boat bears one-fifth of the future loss: .
Step 2: The boat's net gain
. Fishing more pays.
Step 3: The net effect on everyone
. The fishery as a whole is worse off.
Step 4: Why it repeats
Every boat faces the same incentive, so all fish more. The $48 000 of the future loss that each boat does not bear is an external cost imposed on the others. With no owner able to exclude anyone, the stock is run down.
Try it yourself first, then check the working one step at a time.
Answer
(a) +$18 000. (b) −$30 000. (c) Each boat keeps all of its gain but bears only a fifth of the cost, so every boat overfishes and the stock declines.
Method
Private cost = the user's share of the shared cost.
Compare private benefit with private cost, then with total cost.
Watch out for
Using the whole $60 000 as the boat's cost: the point is that it bears only a share.
The root cause is ill-defined property rights. Nobody owns the fish until they are caught, or the atmosphere's capacity to absorb carbon dioxide, so nobody has the right to charge for using it or the incentive to conserve it. Each user's overuse imposes a cost on all the others: an externality.
Fish season by season under open access. Then try a total catch quota and property rights, and compare what is left of the stock.
Why does open access lead to overfishing even when every fisher knows the stock is falling?
Global commons. Some commons cross every border. The atmosphere absorbs greenhouse gases from every country, and the orbits around Earth are filling with space junk: dead satellites, spent rocket stages and fragments from collisions that threaten working satellites. No single government owns these resources (a lack of common ownership), and no government can make the others act. A country that cuts its emissions pays the whole cost but receives only a share of the benefit, so each country is tempted to free ride on the others' efforts.
Note
Coordinating on climate
The Paris Agreement (2015) relies on each country setting and reporting its own target; there is no world government to enforce them. Australia's Climate Change Act 2022 legislated a target of cutting emissions to 43% below 2005 levels by 2030 and net zero by 2050. Because the benefit of any one country's cuts is shared by the world, governments' options are limited: a strong domestic policy can make local industries less competitive if trading partners do less, and that risk shapes how far each country is willing to go.
Extending property rights. If the problem is that nobody owns the resource, one answer is to create rights over it. Property rights work when they are:
- clearly defined: everyone knows what is owned and by whom;
- exclusive: the owner can keep others out and keeps the benefits of conserving;
- transferable: rights can be sold to whoever values them most;
- enforceable: there is a way to detect and punish breaches.
With those features, an owner gains from conserving the resource, because the future value belongs to them.
| Measure | How it extends property rights | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Exclusive economic zones (the syllabus's "economic exclusion zones") | Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal country has sovereign rights over the fish, oil, gas and minerals out to 200 nautical miles from its coast, so it can exclude foreign fleets and manage the stock. | Australia manages its zone through the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). |
| Total allowable catch and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) | A limit on the total catch is shared out as quotas that can be bought and sold, so each holder owns a share of the fishery and gains when the stock is healthy. | Since a 2005 ministerial direction, AFMA has managed Commonwealth fisheries with ITQs where it can. Orange roughy, overfished and listed as conservation dependent in 2006, was protected with catch limits and closures. |
| Zoning in national and marine parks | Areas are set aside with rules on what may be done in each zone, giving the managing authority the right to exclude extractive uses. | The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park zoning plan, in force from 1 July 2004, raised the share of the park in no-take green zones from under 5% to over 33%. |
A fishery issues each licence holder a quota of the total allowable catch. Holders may sell quota to one another, and catches are checked by observers and logbooks. Which feature of property rights does the ability to sell quota provide, and why does it help?
Exam tip
Name the features
For a property-rights question, say which features the measure creates (defined, exclusive, transferable, enforceable), how that changes the user's incentive (they now gain from conserving), and a limitation (enforcement costs at sea, setting the total catch too high, rights that do not extend past national borders).
Summary
A common resource is rival but non-excludable; the tragedy of the commons is its overuse because each user bears only a small share of the cost.
The cause is ill-defined property rights; the effect is depletion and a loss of future value.
Global commons such as the atmosphere and Earth orbit lack common ownership; countries can free ride, which limits each government's options.
Well-defined, exclusive, transferable and enforceable property rights give owners a reason to conserve: EEZs, ITQs and park zoning are examples.
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