Lesson 7: Market power and asymmetric information
The market for lemons
SkillMarket power and information
Worked example
In an illustrative used-car market, half the cars for sale are good and half are lemons. Buyers value a good car at $20 000 and a lemon at $8000; owners of good cars would sell for $17 000 or more, and owners of lemons for $6000 or more. Sellers know which kind they have; buyers cannot tell.
(a) What is the most a buyer will pay for a car of unknown quality? (b) Explain what happens to the good cars, and to the price. (c) Explain why this is a misallocation of resources, and calculate the gain lost on each good car that is not sold. (d) Explain how a statutory warranty helps.
Step 1: The expected value to a buyer
With a 50% chance of each: .
Step 2: Good cars leave the market
Owners of good cars want at least $17 000, more than $14 000, so they do not sell. Only lemons remain on offer. Buyers who realise this will pay no more than $8000.
This is adverse selection: hidden information before the deal means the cars offered are worse than average.
Step 3: The misallocation
Each good car is worth $20 000 to a buyer and $17 000 to its owner, so selling it would make both better off by $3000 in total. That trade never happens: $20 000 − $17 000 = $3000 of value lost per car.
Step 4: The remedy
A statutory warranty makes the dealer responsible for defects, so a buyer has less to fear from hidden faults and will pay more for a car that is in fact good. Owners of good cars can then sell through dealers, and the market for good cars can work.
Answer
(a) $14 000. (b) Good cars are withdrawn and the price falls towards $8000. (c) Mutually beneficial trades are lost, $3000 per good car. (d) A warranty shifts the risk of hidden defects to the seller, restoring buyers' willingness to pay for good cars.
Try a similar one
A fresh question of the same kind, checked as you answer, with hints and a full solution.
Method
Expected value = probability-weighted average.
Compare it with what owners of good cars will accept.
Value lost per trade = buyer value − seller value.
Watch out for
Calling this moral hazard. The hidden thing is information before the sale: adverse selection.