Lesson 7: Market power and asymmetric information

The market for lemons

SkillMarket power and information

Worked example

  • Complex unfamiliar

In an illustrative used-car market, half the cars for sale are good and half are lemons. Buyers value a good car at $20 000 and a lemon at $8000; owners of good cars would sell for $17 000 or more, and owners of lemons for $6000 or more. Sellers know which kind they have; buyers cannot tell.

(a) What is the most a buyer will pay for a car of unknown quality? (b) Explain what happens to the good cars, and to the price. (c) Explain why this is a misallocation of resources, and calculate the gain lost on each good car that is not sold. (d) Explain how a statutory warranty helps.

1 of 4 steps
  1. Step 1: The expected value to a buyer

    With a 50% chance of each: 0.5×20 000+0.5×8000=$14 0000.5 \times 20\,000 + 0.5 \times 8000 = \$14\,000.

    $14 000\$14\,000

Try a similar one

A fresh question of the same kind, checked as you answer, with hints and a full solution.

Method

  1. Expected value = probability-weighted average.

  2. Compare it with what owners of good cars will accept.

  3. Value lost per trade = buyer value − seller value.

Watch out for

  • Calling this moral hazard. The hidden thing is information before the sale: adverse selection.

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